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1ABSTRACT
This report summarizes a two-year effort by the M.I.T. Light Water
Reactor Study Group to assess the institutional, regulatory, technical, and
economic factors influencing the development and deployment of LWR technology.
The nuclear industry is confronted by a mix of problems which, if not
addressed, may soon eliminate LWRs as a practical source of electric energy.
The Study Group found that technical developments could improve nuclear plant
capacity factors by 10 percent; furthermore, substantial economic benefits are
possible through better use of existing technology, further technological
improvements, and various financing schemes. However, the most pronounced
problems are institutional and social, not technical and economic. Regulatory
and institutional problems in licensing, constructing, and operating nuclear
plants have created such uncertainty in the electric utility sector that the
economic and environmental advantages of LWRs are seriously jeopardized.
Regulatory constraints, unpredictability of government policy, unnecessary
construction delays, and the resultant difficulty in obtaining the large-scale
financing needed for new plant construction all discourage the electric
utility sector from making long-term commitments to nuclear power. In the
absence of a concerted government attempt to resolve these and other problems,
public mistrust and legal intervention in the nuclear industry grow
increasingly serious. Thus, the technical and economic improvements that
could benefit the industry will be negated unless the government, the
industrial sector, the electric utilities, and the public address the
regulatory and institutional problems that are threatening to cripple the
industry.
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71. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The M.I.T. Light Water Reactor Project was organized in September
1976 under the sponsorship of the Office of Nuclear Energy Programs,
Department of Energy (then ERDA). The objectives of the project were:
(i) To analyze the institutional and regulatory issues influencing
the development and deployment of nuclear power in the United
States,
(ii) To identify and evaluate technical initiatives to improve the
productivity of nuclear plants, and
(iii) To analyze in economic terms the impact of regulatory,
institutional, and technical initiatives upon the capacity and
generation mix decisions of utilities, upon consumption of
scarce fuels such as oil and gas, upon electricity demand, and
upon the discounted aggregate cost of energy delivered to
consumers.
The findings of the project are presented in a series of technical
and working papers (see References). This Final Report presents a
summary of our analysis and findings. The principal findings are:
(1) The most pronounced problems are institutional and social.
Failure to solve them will effectively eliminate the nuclear
option. Regulatory and institutional problems in licensing,
constructing, and operating nuclear plants are eroding the
economic and environmental advantages of this technology over
alternatives such as coal, oil and gas, and solar. The
continuing social debate reflected in regulatory actions is
threatening to eliminate the nuclear option without a political
consensus having developed to that effect.
(2) Institutional and technical aspects of nuclear power cannot be
fully separated. Our survey of vendors and utilities indicates
that investments in both technical developments and actual
generating capacity are being seriously limited by uncertainty
as to future conditions for technology deployment. Further,
comparisons of U.S. and European regulatory procedures indicate
that U.S. procedures contribute significantly to uncertainty.
(3) A substantial number of technical improvements is attainable.
Our analyses indicate that nuclear plant capacity may be
increased by 64 to 74 percent through technical developments in
turbines, steam generators, condensers, pumps and valves, as
well as improvements in fuel management, the fuel cycle, and
8the fuel itself (leading to the possibility of nuclear in load
following). Reductions in capital costs by as much as 5 to 30
percent may be possible by such technical initiatives as plant
standardization.
(4) Substantial economic benefits are possible both from increased
use of the existing techno ogy and from further technica -
developments. t-Econo-mic ben efi t f onti ued development of
nuclear technology versus a five-year9total moratorium in
nuclear construction equal $13.0 * 10 in discounted energy
costs to consumers. Technically feasible improvements in
nuclear productivity are estimated to provide an $18.0 * 10
reduction in discounted energy costs over that period, with
savings in total oil and gas consumption of 40 * 10 barrel
equivalents.
(5) Uncertainty about the future of the utility sector and the
difficulties accompanying this uncertainty tend to proliferate
InstabiityF. For example, our amb -valence- aout the social
merits of nuclear power in the long-term or inordinate delays
in deciding on a policy of waste disposal tend to discourage
electric utility companies and vendors from making long-term
commitments, which in turn encourage anti-nuclear attitudes.
(6) DOE (and other federal agencies) need to deal with the full
range of principal difficulties associated with nuclear power.
Most important is public acceptance, which arises from a long
educational process of building public understanding of energy
options, energy costs, and environmental and social
consequences. Included here are options and attitudes with
respect to both energy conservation and provision, direct and
indirect impacts on international stability, social costs and
benefits that lie outside conventional economic time frames,
and so forth. Also, we see a need to bring closer together the
principal option developers (presently the federal government),
the industrial sector, the electric utilities, and the public.
92. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
2.1 Uncertainty
The most serious problems facing the U.S. nuclear power sector
are not technical; they are social and institutional. Chief among them
is the proliferation of uncertainty and its effects on the perceptions
and actions of the electric utilities. Technical solutions alone,
therefore, will not save the nuclear option. It is the utilities that
must buy new power plants, and in a climate of excessive uncertainty they
will not do so. Thus, although many governmental and nongovernmental
actors are involved, we concentrate primarily on the electric utility
sector.
Some of the causes of uncertainty have been discussed fairly
thoroughly by others and the required action seems relatively clear
(e.g., with regard to uranium availability), while others, although much
mentioned, demand further attention. We see four major sources of
uncertainty:
(1) changing regulatory constraints
(2) unpredictability of government policy
(3) construction delays due to intervention by critics of
nuclear power
(4) difficulty in obtaining large-scale financing for new
plant construction. (This problem arises partly as a
consequence of the first three, and partly from the
general difficulty of obtaining large sums of capital in
times of inflation and economic instability. We feel that
amelioration of items 1 - 3 would change the investment
climate substantially; but analysis of the industry
financing problem is beyond the scope of this study.)
Each of these is discussed below.
2.1.1 Changing Regulatory Constraints: Lack of a sufficiently
articulated philosophy makes it impossible for utilities to predict what
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direction future regulatory changes will take. Even after a plant has
been completed, changing regulations can require installation of new
equipment or expensive backfitting. Although this can be expected in
cases where pressing environmental needs or safety issues were not
foreseen when a plant was originally licensed (e.g., retrofitting sulphur
dioxide scrubbers on coal-burning plants), the utilities nevertheless
perceive nuclear regulatory requirements to be overbearing.
Utilities that must double their entire historical investment
to construct nuclear plants risk bankruptcy if future regulatory changes
make them uneconomical to operate (in comparison to other options) before
they have returned their initial investment. Changes in environmental
requirements similarly delay and restrict siting.
2.1.2 Unpredictability of Government Policy: The second major
source of uncertainty is the utilities' perception that the Federal
government's attitude toward nuclear power is unpredictable. Despite
promises to act, the government has neither developed a national waste
disposal plan nor made a firm commitment to the domestic use of nuclear
power. The inherent fallacy of completely isolating the regulation from
the promotion of nuclear power (doing so allows each actor to pursue its
own goals without regard for the effects its actions might have on the
others) has caused the bureaucracy to operate at cross-purposes. Among
the resulting regulatory-induced technical problems are:
(1) the fuel adjustment clause, which fails to encourage
development or use of low-cost fuels
(2) environmental requirements and limitations on site
availability, which limit potential future cost reductions
(3) regulatory agencies working at cross-purposes, a good
example of which is the Seabrook, N.H. nuclear plant,
where both the EPA and the NRC have alternately granted
and denied permission to proceed with construction
ll
2.1.3 Intervention by Critics: Anti-nuclear groups, partly by
intervening through the courts and partly by fostering a climate of
social unacceptability, have made the future of nuclear power very
uncertain. Public opposition to nuclear power therefore deserves careful
attention, both with respect to its overt aspects and its implicit social
content.
The anti-nuclear debate arose partly from the intellectual
legacy of nuclear weapons, partly from fear of the unknown, and partly
because various environmental and other groups gradually shifted their
focus from simple chemical polluters (until about 1970), to large
polluting industries in general, and finally, to the nuclear power
sector. Until recently this distrust was exacerbated by the relative
lack of responsiveness to social issues by the Congress, the Executive
branch, and the nuclear industry.
Gradually, the original concerns over environmental hazards
were subsumed in a much wider, highly-politicized debate. Technical and
environmental issues now appear more often as weapons used to accomplish
broader social objectives, leading to deception by both sides as each
shows selective inattention to different parts of the problem. For
example, the pro-nuclear sector tends to ignore problems inherent in
large-system management, the long-term effects of energy, etc. The
anti-nuclear sector likewise tends to perform fairly shallow comparative
assessments. Some intervenors, having larger social objectives in mind,
attempt to keep the real or conjectural difficulties with nuclear power
highly visible to the public, which in pragmatic political terms means
keeping the problems from being solved in order to eliminate the nuclear
power option as quickly and effectively as possible.
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We see nothing to prevent this sort of polarized debate from
being transferred to other energy sources once public consciousness has
been raised. For example, coal suffers from several well-known
difficulties and could be in for harsh treatment as its problems become
more widely publicized.
The structure of American government is not well prepared to
reduce this polarization. Purposely designed as a weak federal system in
terms of imposing decisions from above, American government makes it
relatively easy (as compared to a strong parliamentary system) for issues
to cycle throughout the system several times before decisions are
reached. It is difficult for semi-independent executive, legislative,
Judicial, and regulatory groups to agree. The resulting virtually
unlimited opportunities to intervene have prevented decisions from
serving as indicators of possible future regulatory changes.
2.2 Present Effects of Uncertainty
Uncertainty shortens the time perspectives in which utilities
operate. The utilities are inherently conservative due to 40-year
equipment lifetimes, slow staff turnover, and continued similarity of
product. Afraid to undertake such expensive and risky projects as
constructing nuclear power plants, the utilities, accustomed to looking
40 years ahead, instead find themselves forced into the schizophrenic
position of having to concentrate on short-term strategies (such as doing
nothing) until the public mood and political climate change.
Furthermore, the electric utilities do not have sufficient
incentives to prepare for their long-term future because others (mainly
DOE) are doing the R,D&D work and the utilities are not closely coupled
to the process. Also, the electric utilities, especially after being
13
criticized for advertising (deemed inappropriate for a regulated
industry), are either unwilling or unprepared to participate in further
socio-political debate. When nuclear opponents raise broad social
criticisms of nuclear power, the utilities find themselves unprepared to
reply and hence fall onto the defensive. The public, believing the
utilities have nothing to say in defense of nuclear power, gradually
becomes more sympathetic to the opposition.
2.3 Likely Long-Term Effects of Continuing Uncertainty
Since the electric utility sector's rewards are based not on
building nuclear reactors, but rather on providing reliable low-cost
service, the utilities' perceptions of uncertainty and its consequences
force them to seek unilateral relief can unilaterally, mainly by opting
out of highly controversial issues and technologies. As the utilities
try to reduce their public vulnerability, the most visible of these
issues--nuclear power--will be the first to collapse. The principal
nuclear vendors, anticipating such reactions (and none of them having
more than 25 percent of their business in nuclear power), may selectively
opt out even earlier. We suggest that such changes may occur as early as
1980.
The collapse of the nuclear industry will not be an isolated
result, because uncertainty looms with respect to other energy sources
like coal, including not only how to mine, transport, and burn it in
environmentally acceptable ways, but also uncertain future costs. The
electric utilities will likely decide that their best strategy is to wait
for external events to force a new public consensus--for turbine systems,
oil, gas, coal, or whatever--and then to respond.
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The dangers of making decisions in such capricious ways are
obvious. If the nuclear sector collapses it cannot be easily rebuilt.
The principal impediments are:
(a) the large vendors would demand assurances of governmental
financial and policy support (which the government would
not be able to provide),
(b) the utilities would demand similar guarantees of
supportive government intervention, and
(c) small specialized suppliers (of pumps, valves, etc.),
having built up a technological infrastructure in vain,
would have abandoned the field and woula not wish to
resume the activity.
More drastically and realistically, the private utilities may
opt out of the generating business altogether and concentrate instead
on the relatively calmer business of distributing electricity. As in
most other industrialized countries, power generation would then be left
to public corporations like the TVA. Many people connected with the
utility industry and with option preparation are now discussing this
possibility, but none seem willing to initiate public debate on this
important yet highly sensitive issue. We believe that a shift towards
public ownership of generating facilities requires serious discussion, if
only to forestall an unanticipated shift in that direction.
2.4 Specific Issues and Tasks
Several specific issues need attention, particularly by DOE.
Effective action, however, requires consensus building among the many
sectors involved. We see the following as essential to assuring the
continued viability of the nuclear option:
(a) more direction by the Federal government in dealing with
energy issues, especially nuclear ones,
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(b) restructured long-term R,D&D for the electric sector, and
(c) increased public confidence in energy decision making.
2.4.1 The Need for Government Direction: To reduce
uncertainty, the Federal government must provide the utilities with an
indication of the direction future regulatory changes are likely to
take. This requires an articulated working policy with respect to
nuclear power that includes a clear commitment to nuclear power, a
national waste disposal plan including fuel reprocessing (probably via
international agreement), and a clarification of the philosophy
underl in he nuclear regulatory process. These activities need to be
decided in the context of a comparative assessment of available options:
coal, conservation, and so forth.
All of these actions require the government to take a
leadership role--something it has not yet done. The public cannot
foresee energy problems that lurk just over the horizon, and subsequently
will not call for government action until it is too late. The lead time
needed to develop and/or construct new generating facilities is so long
that, when shortages have become acute enough to attract widespread
public concern, waiting five or ten years longer may be economically
disastrous.
2.4.2 The Need to Restructure Long-Term R&D for the Electric
Sector: The R,D&D structure of the electric sector and, a fortiori, of
the nuclear sector, exists in its present form not because of logical
planning, but rather by happenstance. The problem is that the principal
option users--the electric utilities--have little direct voice in which
options are prepared for the future. Conversely, the principal option
developers--the Federal government and particularly DOE--lack sufficient
input from the utilities regarding long-term needs.
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This schism developed because the task of preparing new
technical options, traditionally left by the utilities to the large
vendors (GE and Westinghouse, for example), became uncomfortably
expensive for any single vendor. By default, the Federal government
gradually took over the task, first with nuclear power and, more
recently, with fossil fuels. This separation of option users from
developers is more acutely felt in the U.S. than in other countries where
electric power systems are public and, hence, not as remote from other
government sectors.
The total amount invested in energy R,D&D nationally is 2 to 3
percent of total gross sales, with approximately two-thirds invested by
the Federal government. The total percentage is not unreasonable, at
least ab initio. AT&T, which, like the power generation sector, is
capital intensive, regulated, and long-lasting, for decades has spent
nearly 3 percent of its gross income on R&D through Bell Laboratories.
This has enabled it to stay at the forefront of communications technology
without government support.
The main difference between the electricity-generating and the
telephone sectors is that the former is fragmented and poorly organized
while the latter is not. This lack of coordination as well as the
utilities' reluctance to concern themselves with pressing social issues
have been widely recognized. The Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) was founded in 1973 in response to a 1971 Senate challenge to the
industry to address its own future as well as environmental and other
social problems. EPRI's present budget is under $200 million, less than
0.3 percent of the nation's total electric bill. The electricity-related
R,D&D tasks picked up by the Federal government amount to $1,708 million
(FY'1979), about 2.5 percent of the electric power bill.
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Consider now the advantages of an expanded consortium designed
to bring the electric utilites, the government, the national
laboratories, and industry closer together.
In accordance with the equitable custom of encouraging
beneficiaries of the R,D&D process to pay development costs, the
utilities might charge customers 1 or 2 percent more for every KWhr sold,
thereby raising about $1 billion for long-term electricity-related
R,D&D--an appropriate sum for the task at hand. Not only would the
Federal government be able to reduce its sponsorship of energy R,D&D, but
the utilities, because they would help determine how these funds were
spent, would be stimulated to prepare for their own future. Thus, the
developers and the users of energy options need to be brought together.
An energy consortium, consisting of representatives of the utilities, the
Federal government, the regulators, the national laboratories, the
private sector, and the public, could meet to determine which avenues of
long-term energy R,D&D ought to be pursued.
The energy consortium would distribute funds to various private
sector research organizations, universities, and national laboratories to
pursue promising R,D&D areas. The utilities would be more closely
coupled with promising R,D&D areas. The utilities would be more closely
coupled with the R,D&D process and the allocation of R,D&D funds would
better reflect a consensus on national energy needs and development
priorities.
New arrangements of this sort may already be starting
informally. As an example, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)
Director and the TVA Chairman agreed on the usefulness of ORNL performing
R,D&D and TVA performing initial demonstrations of new systems. Details
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remain to be worked out, but any such significant activity will
necessarily involve the industrial sector (whose response depends on
whether they see these ventures as leading to real commercialization),
environmental and regulatory agencies (as TVA plans to put new systems
into its operation), the public, and the Federal government (now in a
less central role). If such cooperation succeeds, it will be by having
faced many of the same institutional issues that a national consortium
would have to face.
2.4.3 The Need to Increase Public Confidence in Energy
Decision Making: We do not believe that any satisfactory resolution of
energy problems or uncertainty can come without better public
understanding of the issues and their possible solutions. This is a
long-term consciousness-raising and educational activity that would take
many years to accomplish. The Federal government has failed to
distinguish between short-term propaganda and long-term education in the
public interest. All too often, it has abandoned the latter for fear of
inadvertently becoming the former.
DOE's 1979 budget allocates no funds for educational
activities. $63.4 * 106 are listed for information collection,
analysis, and distribution, but nearly every dollar relates to the
transfer and utilization of technical data in the Department's
professional activities. Failure of the government to exercise its role
as a legitimate representative of the public interest has left an
intellectual vacuum into which have rushed many others, all offering
personal visions of what the future should look like.
Public faith in "big government" and "big business" is at a
nadir. As energy shortages become increasingly severe, the public will
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be asked to make greater sacrifices in its life-style and the importance
of public confidence in the energy decision-making process will be
greatly magnified. A citizenry resentful of a "technocratic elite"
arbitrarily deciding the fate of the nation will not heed the pleas for
conservation that will be so critical in the future.
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3. REGULATORY ISSUES
3.1 Introduction
This portion of the LWR project was initiated because of the
recognition that a major impediment to acceptance of nuclear technology
in the United States is the system of public safety and environmental
protection regulation. We conclude that the most significant deterrent
to the growth of nuclear power in the United States currently is the
regulatory system. This is true because the system provides an effective
and attractive avenue for the expression of popular opposition to the use
of nuclear power. Without such opposition we believe the regulatory
system could operate efficiently; however, some unique features of the
U.S. system leave it very vulnerable for use as a vehicle for political
action by anti-nuclear groups. In other western countries this is not
the case.
Our work does not assess whether the public health, safety, and
environmental protection criteria under which nuclear power is regulated
are adequate. Attention instead focuses upon how these criteria are
implemented.
The work consists of two major parts: an examination of the
experience and perceptions of the U.S. nuclear utility industry regarding
Light Water Reactor (LWR) technology; and an examination of the nuclear
regulatory systems and nuclear utility experiences in England, France,
Sweden, and West Germany. These countries were selected because they are
all industrialized; are culturally similar to the United States; have
substantial nuclear power experience; and have differing nuclear
regulatory systems and utility ownership patterns. Thus, an examination
of nuclear power in these countries provides a context for comparison
with the U.S., and a basis for formulating of policy recommendations.
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3.2 Nature of the United States Nuclear Regulatory System
There are two aspects to the United States nuclear regulatory
system: the procedures followed in performing the various regulatory
tasks, and the structure of the political system that has determined
those procedures. Most attempts to "reform" the regulatory system have
been concerned with improvements in the efficiency of regulatory
procedures; much less attention has been given to structural changes.
"Reform" attempts that focus on questions of the efficiency of
procedures are likely to be ineffective, since most of the fundamental
problems of nuclear power regulation arise from the nature of the
regulatory system itself, not from the procedures through which it acts.
Inherent in the idea that the nuclear regulatory system is
inefficient is the belief that proper public safety and environmental
protection goals can be met with a smaller commitment of time and money.
The principal means by which licensing inefficiency is expressed is
through delay in granting Operating License and Construction Permits.
Such delays impose costs, several types of which are important as weapons
in the current political "guerrilla warfare" being waged against use of
nuclear technology. Pressure groups that oppose its use have found that
their ability to impose uncontrolled nuclear project costs upon utilities
via licensing delays gives them the means to negotiate directly with
utilities for modification of such projects. More importantly, the
possibility of encountering such uncontrolled costs has had a "chilling"
effect within many utility companies regarding plans to embark on new
nuclear projects.
The United States nuclear licensing process is structurally
deficient in several important ways:
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(a) Great attention is paid by the public and the collective
governmental regulatory system to issues of public health and
environmental impacts associated with nuclear technology, while
similar questions arising from the use of alternative energy
technologies--especially coal--are either ignored or treated as
being much less serious. As a result, the environmental and
safety risks of nuclear power are considered in a vacuum, with
no context for udging the relative magnitudes of the effects
being considered. It also results in an unbalanced protection
of the environment and public health, with nuclear hazards
being reduced to very low levels and some non-nuclear effects
being tolerated without concern at much greater hazard levels.
(b) The nuclear regulatory system is required to resolve a set
of questions that are mainly political rather than technical.
This burden--which the system is inadequate to carry--is the
principal cause of the current nuclear licensing "crisis." It
is notable that the foreign nuclear regulatory systems which we
studied maintain a clear separation between political and
technical questions, confining themselves to the latter class
of issues. This is a major factor in the much greater
efficiency of these European systems. Examples of such
political questions are those concerning acceptable levels of
risk, the need for power, and the cost-benefit balancing of a
project.
(c) If political issues are to be removed from nuclear project
licensing, alternative avenues must be established to resolve
them. The idea is later developed that the United States'
nuclear regulatory system emphasizes promotion of health and
environmental values at the expense of economic values. This
occurs in this instance because the American political system
does not balance such opposing social values. Thus, by
default, the balancing of such values must be incorporated into
regulatory decision making.
(d) The role of the public (i.e., intervenors) in licensing
nuclear projects is a unique feature of the United States'
nuclear regulatory system. Such participation stems from the
American tradition of having the functions of the bureaucracy
easily accountable to the citizens. However, the effects of
such participation in nuclear plant licensing are different
from those which are widely perceived. Intervenors are mainly
credited with raising important reactor safety issues
previously ignored by NRC staff. Intervenors and "public
interest" groups have been important in publicizing neglected
safety issues and in exploiting them in licensing proceedings,
but not in identifying them initially.
3.3 Results of the United States Nuclear Utility Survey
Historical Data: The purpose of the survey is to quantify the
uncertainty and associated costs that have been experienced in U.S.
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nuclear projects, to try to assess the degree to which such uncertainty
affects utility willingness to use LWR technology, and to identify
aspects of the nuclear regulatory system that contribute significantly to
such uncertainty. The results of this work are presented in the 1978
report, "Effects of Environmental Protection and Public Safety Regulatory
Practices Upon Light Water Reactor Economics", MIT EL 78-009. In the
survey, all U.S. electric utility organizations that have prime
responsibility for a current nuclear project were contacted. All but two
of the organizations contacted agreed to cooperate with the study.
The major points are summarized below:
o Since the late 1960's the ability of a utility to obtain a
construction permit according to the originally
anticipated schedule has been very poor, and in recent
years most licensed power plants have required
substantially longer durations for Construction Permit
Licensing than the nominal 22-month duration specified by
the NRC.
o The range of licensing duration varies substantially from
plant to plant, indicating that the licensing process is
highly unpredictable and that utility companies have
historically tended to underestimate significantly the
required durations.
o The time required to build a plant has grown steadily
during recent years, as power plants have grown larger and
more complex; a deviation from the mean construction time
of approximately 10+ months is typical; and the ratio of
the longest to the shortest construction time in a given
docket year typically falls in the range of 1.3 to 2.0.
o When historical nuclear plant unit capacity costs are
discounted for escalation and interest during
construction, it is seen that for plants coming on-line
since 1974 costs remain approximately constant. The
scatter in the data arises from regional differences in
labor costs and safety requirements. Therefore, the
contention that nuclear plant costs continue to grow
steadily is false.
It is impossible to state with any useful degree of precision
what fraction of total delays in the U.S. nuclear projects is due to the
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regulatory system; however, a consensus exists that the regulatory
contribution is significant. This situation stands in marked contrast to
that of the foreign countries examined in our work, where the consensus
is that the regulatory systems are not important contributors to wasteful
nuclear project costs.
It is also clear from our interviews with utility managers that
the prospect of large uncontrolled costs provides an important
disincentive for the use of nuclear technology in the U.S., in spite of
the fact that utility personnel generally believe that nuclear technology
is safe, reliable, and--in most parts of the country--economically
competitive. Several utility companies have decided to defer all future
nuclear projects until uncertainties associated with the regulatory
system are substantially reduced.
3.4 Examination of Foreign Nuclear Regulatory Systems
The purpose of examining the systems of nuclear regulation in
selected foreign countries (England, France, Sweden, and West Germany) is
to observe the various nuclear histories under different regulatory
systems.
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the nuclear utility
and regulatory systems in each country. Note that the utility patterns
and nuclear regulatory systems of the U.S. and Sweden are similar while
those of the remaining countries are not. In addition, Sweden, West
Germany and the United States have effective nuclear moratoria while
France and England do not.
The nuclear regulatory systems that are most dramatically
different from that in the United States are those of France and
England. The European regulatory systems examined differ from one
26
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another in the procedures used. However, in comparison to the United
States system, the similarities among the European systems are more
important than their apparent differences. These similarities arise from
the similar nature of the political systems under which they operate--all
of which are very different from that of the United States. The most
important common feature is that each of these countries has a
parliamentary system of government in which the majority party(ies) in
the parliament also control the national executive branch. Since each of
these countries is relatively small compared to its neighbors than is the
United States, there is in each a more strongly perceived need for
economic coordination by the government. Consequently, the governmental
mandate for definition and promotion of both economic and public health
and environmental protection goals is much clearer than in the United
States, and explicit balancing of such values is performed in the
formulation of national policy. In addition, control of the executive by
the majority party largely eliminates the conflicts between the
legislative and the executive branches which often arise in the American
system. Consequently, the formulation of clear executive policies--which
are then implemented by the bureaucracy--is much more efficient in the
European systems, with conflicting political values being compromised in
the formulation of the policy. In the European systems the economic
justification of a nuclear project and the general public health and
environmental protection goals governing the project are formulated at
the same levels (ministerial) of government as national policy. In the
American system the latter set of goals are formulated (at least
implicitly) as state and national goals which are implemented locally,
but a comprehensive national economic plan is not explicitly formulated
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at any governmental level, except with regard to federal budget and
monetary policy. Thus, the mandates of United States governmental
agencies are weighted unequally toward protection of public health and
environmental values at the expense of economic values. In fact, in the
U.S. there is no general explicit mandate to consider economic factors in
public health and environmental regulation of nuclear projects.
In both the U.S. and the European countries the major level of
regulatory enforcement is at the local individual project level, but in
all of these countries attempts at national or regional public health and
environmental enforcement actions are also evident--especially in France
and England.
Due to the lack of a clear policy in the United States
regarding many political questions affecting nuclear power projects
(e.g., need-for-power, definition of socially acceptable safety levels,
etc.), many such questions are left, by default, to be resolved in
individual nuclear project licensing procedures. This happens because
national economic policy is fragmented and public health and
environmental goals are incompletely expressed. In the European nuclear
regulatory systems, on the other hand, such political questions are
resolved through the political process, and the processes of nuclear
project licensing are insulated from the need to resolve such issues.
Thus, European nuclear project licensing is concerned mainly with
resolving technical questions of public safety and environmental
protection, while that in the United States is confused by the additional
burden of political questions, which it is poorly equipped to treat.
This is a major reason for the perceived failure of the American nuclear
regulatory process.
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In each of the European countries there is a tradition that the
bureaucracy is relatively immune from interference by private parties.
Thus, in all of these countries the ability of a citizen affected by
governmental action to seek satisfaction or a modification of an action
by the responsible agency is much more severely limited than in the
United States. As a result, bureaucratic actions can be less inhibited
by the possibility of criticism because effective avenues for direct
individual opposition to such actions are largely unavailable, and
because agency actions would generally be taken in executing
clearly-established executive policies. The major option for a citizen
or interest group opposing a particular bureaucratic action is to modify
the position within the controlling political party responsible for the
executive policy being implemented. Consequently, opposition to the
nuclear power programs in these European countries has been expressed
mainly by political means--by attempting to modify the positions of the
pro-nuclear parties and by trying to strengthen the anti-nuclear
parties. Anti-nuclear groups have not been a large factor in the process
of licensing individual nuclear plants. Uniformly, both electric utility
and regulatory respondents in the countries surveyed reported that
needless licensing delays are not significant factors in nuclear
projects. The anti-nuclear groups in these countries, partially
reflecting frustration in being unsuccessful in opposing individual
nuclear projects, have expressed opposition through numerous violent
demonstrations, notably in France and West Germany.
A symptom of the degree to which the regulatory processes in
these European countries is closed to the public is indicated by the fact
that the official files regarding individual nuclear project regulatory
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actions in all of the countries examined (except Sweden) are
substantially closed to the public.
Another important aspect in which the European nuclear
regulatory systems differ from that in the United States is that of
public hearings concerning nuclear projects. In all of the countries
examined, public hearings occur early in the process and are of the
legislative-type, conducted without cross-examination, with witnesses not
under oath, and with testimony being presented for the information of the
agency conducting the hearing. Except in England and West Germany, the
hearings arise in the context of land-use or zoning, to determine whether
a proposed site is appropriate for nuclear power use. In Sweden such
hearings are held by the Water Court. The local government can veto a
nuclear project at this stage. It is important to note that the results
of such hearings generally consist of either a decision regarding whether
the site can accommodate a nuclear project successfully or a report to
the ministry in charge of nuclear regulation. In each case a citizen
appeal of the results of the hearings is possible only if it can be shown
that improper procedures were followed. Appeals regarding the substance
of decisions reached in the hearings--as is possible in the United
States--are usually not permitted.
In all of the European countries surveyed no significant delays
in nuclear projects were reported because of flaws in the nuclear
regulatory system. By contrast, such delays in United States nuclear
projects are widely reported to be one of the most serious disincentives
for LWR use. In addition to the systematic features cited previously,
several organizational features are generally found to aid the efficiency
of the licensing process in the European systems.
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In each of these countries (but especially in France) the
regulatory climate has a strong element of mutual cooperation, personal
trust, and spirit of reasonable compromise between the equipment vendors,
the utility company, and the governmental regulators. This arises from
several factors:
(a) The number of personnel and organizations involved is
relatively small, and with low turnover. This permits
personal relationships to arise through long-term
association and personnel transfer among organizations;
(b) Effectively all of the actors from the various
organizations are engaged in a plan sanctioned by the
central government to install a desired level of
generating capacity at a desired level of safety;
(c) The technical judgment of the staff is used to evaluate
proposed designs, and very few rigidly codified judgmental
criteria are employed; and
(d) A spirit of reasonable compromise exists in treating areas
of technical uncertainty since the detailed licensing
process is largely immune from non-governmental review and
criticism.
By contrast, in the United States the regulatory climate is
adversarial, legalistic, cumbersome, and sometimes acrimonious. There
are several reasons for this:
(a) The numbers of personnel and organizations involved
nationally are large. Thus, more rigidly formalized
procedures are required.
(b) In attempting to standardize the licensing process, a
large literature of judgmental criteria has been
developed, including Congressional legislation, federal
regulations, individual agency guidelines, and judicial
rulings--all of which must be respected by regulatory
decision makers.
(c) No national or state-level electric energy development
plans become incorporated into the licensing review as
judgment criteria.
(d) Initial regulatory decisions are subject to subsequent
administrative and judicial reviews and may be rendered
moot by the actions of other uncoordinated agencies.
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(e) Access to the process by interested non-governmental
parties is relatively easy.
(f) The process involves consideration of issues that are both
political and economic (e.g., the need for new generating
capacity), which in other national regulatory systems are
kept out of the regulatory process.
(g) The process often requires consideration of generic
technical issues on a plant-by-plant basis, so a specific
plant-related decision acquires importance far beyond the
single plant being licensed.
(h) There is a climate of public distrust of its governmental
agencies and of large private organizations. This has
been translated into a political atmosphere that rewards
caution and punishes risk-taking decisions by politicians
and by governmental officials.
3.5 Conclusions
The foregoing discussion indicates that the basic fault of the
United States nuclear regulatory system is its failure to resolve
technical questions of public health and environmental protection when it
is also encumbered by responsibility for political questions, which it is
not prepared to treat. Improving this situation requires creation of
alternative institutional arrangements to address these political
questions--preferably at the same levels of government at which national
public health and environmental protection policy is determined. The
value of such modifications is illustrated clearly by the efficiency of
the nuclear regulatory systems of England, France, Sweden, and West
Germany, where such modifications are in effect.
There is currently an effective nuclear moratorium in the
United States, in large part because of the great climate of uncertainty
that exists among electric utility organizations as a consequence of the
unpredictability, capriciousness, lack of dependability, and perceived
illogic of the overall nuclear regulatory system. This situation could
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be dismissed merely as a nuisance for utility executives if it were not
for the large economic, social, and environmental costs that society pays
in using this system. If these costs are to be reduced, substantial
structural and procedural modifications of the current system will be
required.
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4. TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF LIGHT WATER REACTOR IMPROVEMENT
4.1 Strategies for Fixed Cost Improvements
Capital cost is the major component of the fixed cost. A
second component of the fixed cost is the Operation and Maintenance
(O & M) costs. The term "fixed" is used for those costs that are
independent of the quantity of electricity generated. This is strictly
true for capital cost and the operation part of the 0 & M cost; the
maintenance portion of the 0 & M cost, though often described as
variable, is included here since it is convenient and in any case is only
a small portion of the total cost. It is also recognized that "fixed
cost" varies with other parameters, the most important of which is time.
Such parameters are included in the following assessment of the fixed
cost.
4.1.1 Capital Cost Assessment of LWR Power Plants: Capital
cost accounts for about 90 percent of the fixed (i.e. non-fuel) portion
of the electricity busbar cost. This was reflected in the way the effort
of this group was allocated: major attention was given to capital cost,
while relatively minor attention was given to the other fixed cost
component, the 0 & M cost.
Early in the study, a survey was conducted that included most
LWR equipment vendors and A/E firms, and also about 30 utilities in the
United States. Questions were presented in the form of defined variables
that would be evaluated under a set of applicable assumptions. These
variables describe the current status of the LWR capital cost, its future
trend, the effectiveness of various improvement options, and the
influence of the limiting factors. Variables related to the 0 & M cost
were also included. Additional comments were requested. The results of
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the survey were tabulated in statistical format and used as needed in the
report. The overall results indicate a value of $592/KW (1977 $) for the
capital cost, as explained in the following section.
Capital Cost Base Case: The survey data were first used to
formulate the base case of LWR power plant capital cost. The
computation was done with the CONCEPT Code, Phase 5, February 1978.
The base case problem describes the current status of capital cost,
from which variations can be investigated as conditions change for
each other problem. The following table specifies the base problem
and summarizes the computed results.
The base case problem:
Plant power capacity, MWe 1200
Number of generating units 1
Reactor type PWR
Cooling system Mech
Location Bost
Date of NSSS commitment 1/1/
Date of C.P. issue 1/1/
Date of commercial operation 1/1/
AFDC effective annual rate, % 9.0
Results:
Fore Cost (1977) $/KWe
Equipment Cost 216
Labor Cost 129
Material Cost 67
Indirect Costs 180
TOTALS 592
Tail Cost (1988) $/KWe
Overall Rate of Escalation
during Construction 6.76 percent
Cost of Escalation during
Construction 312
TOTAL TAIL COST 904
. Draft Tower
on, MA
77
81
88
16.1
9.6
5.0
13.4
44.1
23.2
67.3
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Results (continued):
Allowance for Funds Used
during Construction 438 32.6
Commercial Cost (1988) 1341 100
The fore cost of a particular year is the cost of the plant if
it could be completely built in that year. Since the plant construction
takes several years, the fore cost value changes with escalation. The
tail cost is the sum of the fore cost at the beginning of the proJect and
the cost of escalation during construction (CEDC). When the allowance
for funds used during construction (AFDC) is added to the tail cost the
sum is called the commercial cost, which is the sum of all expenditures
up to date of commercial operation. The fore cost for coal plants with
scrubbers is $515/KWe.
Contribution of Capital Cost Elements: Five elements constitute the
capital cost. Four of them are the fore cost components:
equipment, labor, materials, and indirect cost accounts. The fifth
is time. The contribution of each of the first four is shown in the
right column of the base case results as a percentage of the
commercial cost. The contribution of the fifth element, time, is
the sum of the CEDC and the AFDC, about 56 percent of the commercial
cost. CONCEPT Code calculations show that the commercial cost
variations are linear functions of the element variations, whose
slope is nearly the fraction of the element contribution to the
commercial cost. This illustrates the independence of the five
elements. For the first three elements this result is true when the
cost variations are caused by price variations rather than by
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changing required quantities. The major items of indirect cost are
the home-office engineering and construction facilities and
equipment, which are responsible for 3.5 and 3.2 percent of the
commercial cost, respectively. Their influence on capital cost is
similar to that of the first three elements.
The fifth element, time, has peculiar characteristics. It is
the largest contributor when measured as the sum of CEDC and AFDC,
whose quantity is the years of the project lead time modified by the
project cash flow, and its unit cost is in terms of the annual CEDC
and AFDC rates. It is not a completely independent element that
merely adds to the fore cost; it also augments the fore cost. The
major contribution of time comes in the case of project delay, i.e.,
when the date of NSSS commitment is fixed. The commercial cost
variation is still linear, but has a large slope. One year's change
makes a difference of about 10 percent of the commercial cost, and 1
percent change in the AFCD rate makes about 5 percent change in the
commercial cost. The interesting result emerges when the date of
commercial opera ion is i e an he project lead time varies.
Here no significant change in the commercial cost occurs, because
the resulting opposite variations of the CEDC and AFCD almost cancel
each other.
Capital Cost Trend: A result of a study covering the 1967-1987
period shows a steady increase in the commercial cost at an average
annual rate of 10.2 percent. Lately, the change in commercial cost
has been even more dramatic. The past 4-1/2 years have shown an
increase in the fore cost from $211/kWe to $592/kWe, or about a 26
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percent annual rate of increase. In addition, the project lead
times have increased by about 50 percent on the average, over the
same period. Throughout the 1970s project lead time has increased
at a rate of 9 to 10 months each year. Capital cost is expected to
rise at an average rate of $56/kWe/yr until about 1990. This is
despite the fact that the plant sizes have doubled during the first
half of this period and the specific cost of large plants is about
two-thirds of that of plants of half their size, if built
simultaneously.
Causes of Capital Cost Increase: The various causes of increases in
capital cost are related to one of two categories: increased
unit-cost and/or increased requirements. The first category is
associated with, say, wages or steel prices, while the second is
associated with increase in quantity required. The unit cost
increase is merely due to the general escalation, and no specific
commodity required for LWR plant construction has shown any sign of
resource depletion. The escalation of LWR capital cost, though
about 1 percent higher than that of general inflation, is mild when
compared to other essential commodities such as housing, whose rate
of escalation in the 1960-1978 period was 8.54 percent.
There are many causes under the increased requirements
category. Larger unit size has increased, among other things, the
amount of capital investment required for a power plant project.
This results in many cases of schedule delay due to financial
difficulties, which only worsens matters. Design changes to improve
the plant availability and meet evolving safety and environmental
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requirements have added more equipment, materials, and associated
labor as well as having increased the indirect costs and stretched
lead times. In the cases of equipment and material, both quantity
and quality requirements are increased. Lower productivity is
another cause, associated with increased paper work, design
complexity, and schedule irregularities, as well as the faster
increase of demand on the labor force relative to the increase in
supply of qualified workers. Public intervention is another cause
that affects the lead time at the various stages of the project, and
especially before issuance of the CP. There are also other factors,
such as changing accounting methods by regulatory amendments, which
in at least one case results in increasing the AFDC by 33 percent.
Possible Improvement Alternatives: Several improvement alternatives
have been identified or proposed, mainly targeted at the time
element of capital cost. For convenience they are divided into
three sets: 1) optimization of current practices, 2)
standardization, and 3) improved industry structure and finance.
Optimization of Current Practices: The first strategy in this
set is to pursue a scheme of design optimization that
concentrates on cost minimization. As a relevant example, use
of remote multiplexing in plant (non-safety) control system may
reduce commercial cost by close to 0.5 percent. Another
strategy is to improve project management in an integrated
manner at all phases of planning, design licensing, and
construction of LWR power plants. Both these schemes require
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the expertise and resources of vendors and architect/engineer
and construction firms. Given the current industry structure,
this report merely emphasizes anticipated actions by the
different industry members with regard to this type of
improvement.
Standardization: Four options have been investigated in this
category. The first is Flotation. Although this concept has
been around for a decade and was one of the earliest three
recognized by the AEC, no practical success has been cited
yet. The first plant is expected to be completed by 1988 at
the earliest. In the meantime, the utility response is
affected by licensing uncertainties surrounding this option.
The question of potential increased risk of a core melting
accident is a major issue. The current cost estimates show a
commercial cost of about 85 to 90 percent of that of the base
case. However, these estimates may not hold once the first
plant is built.
The second option is Duplication. This is defined as
several similar plants that are licensed simultaneously. It
has been practiced in two different ways. First, one utility
licenses a package of units, whether they are at one site or at
different, but nearby sites. This method has gained
considerable success and wide use. The second way includes the
SNUPPS method, when several utilities license similar plants at
sites thousands of miles apart. The success of this option has
been distorted by financial and load reduction problems. In
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this case with respect to the CP lead time, the gains were
relatively significant. Independent of site-related and
non-technical factors, the time savings may reach 20 percent.
The cost reduction is in the range of 6 to 13 percent,
depending on intermediate events.
The third option is Replication. It is the last
considered by the AEC, and hence the least exercised. Given
the market conditions in the last few years, this option did
not have a fair chance; the few replication cases have not
shown any success, although they do not provide sufficient
evidence for fair conclusion.
The fourth is the Reference System option. This met the
greatest enthusiasm of the industry. Several Reference System
designs have been licensed. They differ in scope of design
from NSSS and Balance of Plant, to Nuclear Island and
Turbine-plant Island. Almost all recent applications include
some aspect of this option. The main target of relatively
reducing the CP lead time has been successfully demonstrated.
Once the CP is issued, the construction shedule could be
reduced by 6 to 12 months, with commercial cost savings of
about 10 percent.
The last three options do not constitute a set of mutually
exclusive alternatives, since they can be applied
simultaneously. This in fact reduces the applicability of
replication and attracts attention away from flotation.
Standardization has mainly addressed the physical portion of
plant and could not help with site-related problems which have
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become critical issues. The site issue has placed undesirable
limits on standardization.
Improved Industry Structure and Finance: This set of
improvement schemes is expected to play a role complementary to
the above strategies. The first of three areas in this
category is concerned with licensing procedures. Early
site-approval, as proposed by the NRC, is expected to be
beneficial, but success is limited by state and local
governmental influence. The limited work authorization helps to
complete up to 3 percent of construction before the CP issue.
If the LWA-to-CP period does not exceed a year, capital cost
gain is realized. Otherwise, the associated AFDC can destroy
the benefit, especially if it takes as long as four years after
LWA to obtain the CP. Negative experiences have led several
utilities not to exercise this option. Another proposed scheme
in this area is a Periodic Freeze on regulatory changes, which
could help to ameliorate uncertainty problems.
The second area is a proposal for movement toward large
utility systems, whose activities would include all aspects of
power generation, aside from equipment manufacturing. This
proposal is supported by the success of large utilities
(Commonwealth Edison, Duke, and TVA) in attaining lower capital
cost, with savings ranging from 4 to 30 percent in most of
their regions.
The third area is improved financial methods. The CWIP in
Rate Base is compared to the conventional method. This is
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shown to be a special case of a general method under the
designation of Ultra-Accelerated Depreciation (UAD) methods.
The basic idea is to expense a portion of the current
construction expenditure as a depreciation allowance and match
it with increased revenue from currently operated units. A
mathematical model to evaluate this method has been developed.
With a simple version of the model, the early results show that
the UAD method is promising. Further detailed analysis will be
carried out as part of future work.
Limiting Factors: Seven major factors are identified as follows:
Size: An upper limit on size, imposed by regulatory and
technological considerations, diminished any further benefits
of economics of scale.
Regional Characteristics: Population density, climate, and
topography affect the capital cost which varies between the
regions of U.S. by 15 percent of median value.
Constitutional Division of Authority: This prevents any
imposition of coordinative programs to reduce licensing
conflicts among various government levels.
Public Acceptance of Improved Finance: Public acceptance,
either directly or through the regulatory bodies, is a
prerequisite to implementing any financial improvement scheme.
& M Considerations: Capital cost reduction via decreasing
special and material requirements by tightening plant lay-out
may distort the fixed cost through increased 0 & M requirements.
Growth of Power Generating Capacity: This affects the site
availability and more cost is involved in upgrading sites.
Manufacturing of Equipment: Project schedule improvements are
limited by equipment delivery time. Two years is the shortest
practical period between NSSS commitment and start of
construction.
Conclusion: Current LWR capital cost, although still economically
attractive, has risen to the point where predictable variations and
costs overruns exceed the acceptable level of uncertainty.
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Improvement strategies are feasible where standardization plays a
central role, and Duplication with complete Reference Designs
provides a prime benefit. Effective standardization will be
accomplished only when site-licensing and project financing
improvements are also implemented.
4.1.2 O&M Cost Assessment of LWR Power Plants:
The 1977 value of 0 & M cost is 2.15 mills/kWh, with a standard
deviation between 50 to 60 percent of this value. This corresponds to
about $10.8 kW yr, or about 10 percent of the busbar fixed cost. It
seems that the 0 & M cost is gaining more importance relative to its
current share of fixed cost. Although the 0 & M cost for LWR plants is a
little higher than that of 0 & M cost for fossil plants, both are
experiencing similar escalation patterns.
Labor wages and requirements exhibit an important contribution
to 0 & M cost. Although the labor share is only about 30 percent of the
0 & M cost, it influences about 50 percent of its value through related
expenses.
Activity-wise, the most important 0 & M categories are the
maintenance of reactor plant, miscellaneous nuclear power expenses, steam
expenses, operation supervision and engineering, and maintenance of
electric plant, whose contributions to 0 & M cost are 24, 20.8, 14.4,
10.5, and 10.5 percent, respectively. While these five categories have a
total contribution of 80 percent of the 0 & M cost, they dominate 90
percent of the 0 & M cost increase.
The major causes of 0 & M cost increases have been increased
safety and environmental requirements; security issues are gaining in
importance and are expected to have a dominating effect on future 0 & M
cost behavior.
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Optimization of current practices is the general strategy for
O & M cost improvement. Optimization is concerned with items such as
plant layout improvement regarding 0 & M tasks, 0 & M procedures, and
plant supplies and spare-parts inventories. Accounting measures that
exclude or specifically categorize backfitting expenses charged as annual
O & M expenses is another step toward improvement. Co-location has been
found to provide savings of as much as 37 percent of 0 & M cost.
The trend toward increased 0 & M cost makes it appropriate to
recommend a future study and analysis of current and future 0 & M cost
conditions in order to provide better understanding of causes and
improvement strategies.
4.2 Strategies for Capacity Factor Improvement
4.2.1 Introduction: Nuclear power plants as presently
operating are the economically favored choice among central station
options in many regions of the U.S.. Nevertheless, significant benefits
accrue as nuclear station capacity factors are improved.* To the
consumer of electricity, improved output from existing stations offers a
large dollar return: the high replacement power costs that occur when low
incremental cost nuclear stations are out of service usually appear as
fuel adjustment changes. For the utilities there is the potential for
greater customer satisfaction and more reliable operation of existing
equipment, thereby reducing the need for additional reserve capacity and
delays in constructing new plants. This conservation of installed plant
*Capacity factor is the ratio of annual electrical energy production
(measured in kilowatt-hours) to installed annual capacity (installed
electrical power capacity in kilowatts multiplied by 8766 hours, the
number of hours in one year).
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complements the conservation in end-use already being promoted and offers
a solution to the near-term electricity shortages implied by the low
generating reserve margin forecasts of the National Electric Reliability
Council. As discussed in earlier sections, uncertainties about
financing, regulation, and public acceptability have caused utility
planners to perceive it as necessary or at least prudent to delay
expansion decisions.
Various public and private groups could motivate improvements
in power plant productivity. Candidates include the nuclear steam supply
system vendors, the architect-engineers (A/E), the Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI), the electric utilities, the consumers of
electricity, the state utility regulators, and the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE). The factors motivating each of these groups are examined
below:
(a) The vendors, lacking adequate incentive because there is little
immediate profit to be realized, direct their interest toward future
sales as opposed to servicing past sales. Nevertheless, vendors are
offering improved maintenance packages as well as enhanced
availability through standardized designs.
(b) The A/Es do contract work rather than independent development,
but they too have sensed a need for improved plant productivity.
Responding to utility demands, A/Es now propose to design enhanced
availability plants and to develop productivity improvement programs.
(c) EPRI has been active in identifying problem areas and supporting
long-term basic research, but its total budget limits contracts to
relatively small project size. Particularly problematical are
organizational constraints that essentially preclude large
demonstration contracts with specific utilities.
(d) The individual utilities at first would seem to have the most to
gain: reduced costs, improved profits, consumer good will, and the
opportunity to delay new construction. Unfortunately we see
important deterrents at work here too. Utility management and
engineering staffs are production-oriented, seeking to get the most
out of existing systems rather than improving them. Developing
improvements is less cost effective when applied to a single plant
than when applied to many plants. Rate structures in most states
allow utilities to immediately pass along the major cost of outages
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through fuel adjustment charges. Finally, some rate structures
designed to encourage improved capacity factor are in reality
counter productive, penalizing a utility in the long run for
short-term improvements.
(e) The role of consumers is restricted to applying political
pressure on utilities and regulators. Unfortunately, this pressure
can be misdirected. For example, some "public interest" groups try
to convince consumers that fuel adjustment charges are penalties
resulting from the expense of building nuclear power plants rather
than the cost differential between nuclear and fossil fuels, which
can be reduced by better utilization of existing nuclear plants.
Clearly, there is a need to educate the public. Although
unorganized consumers cannot be expected to direct efforts to
improve capacity factor, they will be the principal beneficiaries
and the other factors should be attentive to their needs and desires.
(f) State regulators exist to protect the interests of the general
public and many are becoming concerned with nuclear plant
productivity and its effect on fuel adjustment charges. Some are
beginning to examine utility management methods to determine if
modern techniques are being used to minimize the delivered cost of
electricity. Because regulatory agencies have not developed
expertise in reliability and decision-optimization methods, they are
not now in a position to wisely apply much pressure in these areas.
Moreover, these are separate and independent state agencies that
cannot impose a uniform incentive across the entire industry. We
note that their growing interest is in itself encouraging utilities
to act positively early on--before regulatory guidelines are
established and become rigid.
(g) DOE is in an excellent position to become the motivating force.
The major beneficiary of improved nuclear plant productivity would
be the general public rather than a specific private interest;
therefore we believe that government agency action would be
particularly appropriate. DOE can mobilize extensive resources to
solve specific technical problems; widely disseminate recommended
changes in equipment design, plant construction, and management
practices; and perhaps provide uniform, technically-competent
guidance to the various state regulators to help them understand the
complexities of productivity management and the long-term
implications of regulatory practices in this area.
Given the need for productivity improvement and several groups
which could pursue that goal, what is the likelihood of economically
realizing growth in nuclear plant capacity factor? The remainder of this
section will show that overall improvement is not only possible, but also
that in several areas it would be quite advantageous.
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4.2.2 The Range of Economic Benefit: As defined earlier,
capacity factor can be considered a measure of the effective size of a
power plant. As such, it is a direct multiplier of the dominant fixed
cost terms in expressions for the busbar cost of electricity
(mills/kilowatt-hour). Capacity factor also has second-order effects on
the remaining cost terms, on the growth of electricity demand, and on the
growth of the nuclear industry. These e e s are demonstrated by the
analyses discussed in Chapter 5, which use the MIT Regional Electricity
Model (REM) to study responses of the U.S. energy system to various
changes in technical, economic, and institutional conditions. The net
long-term result of a fractional increase in capacity factor (say, by 10
percent) is a drop in the busbar cost of electricity by a like amount
(again 10 percent). The short term effect is even more pronounced;
production from existing nuclear plants can displace that from existing
coal and oil plants with a cost savings of between $200 thousand and $1
million per day for a 1000 megawatt-electric plant.* This enormous
savings in replacement power cost means that saving 1 percentage point in
annual capacity factor is worth about $9.0 * 105 per plant year. Using
our reference scenario (Chapter 5, Table 3) as an estimate of the number
of nuclear plants in operation in 1997, and applying a 10 percent
discount rate, that 1 percentage point change in capacity factor
translates into $1.3 billion present-worth savings for those improvements
*The wide range in replacement power cost is caused by many factors,
but most important is system load. Within a given region (power pool)
plants are loaded perferentially--lowest incremental-cost plants first.
A value of $2.0 * 105 per day from the low end of the range is used in
the cost estimates of this chapter.
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affecting all plants, and $600 million present-worth savings for those
restricted to new plants coming on line after 1985.
How much improvement is possible? Capacity factors now average
near 60 percent. Allowing about 8 percent for refueling, a little over 1
percent for load following and coastdown, and at least 5 percent for
regulatory shutdowns and deratings, the upper li i on capacity factor is
about 85 percent. The reader is cautioned that this is an upper limit,
not a reasonable goal; diminishing returns would render it prohibitively
expensive. The best performing half of existing plants presently
averages about 75 percent capacity factor. This is a more realistic goal
and we expect that raising the average capacity factor by 10 to 15
percentage points will be economically viable. The present-worth savings
to the economy through 1997 could approach $15 billion.
4.2.3 Analysis of Annual Capacity Factor Data: Annual
capacity factor data was analyzed statistically in an attempt to model
capacity factor as a function of plant size, age, vendor, reactor type,
and calendar year. No significant trends were identified for boiling
water reactors (BWRs), leaving the best model as simply the mean value of
55.6 percent subject to a very wide standard error of 15.3 percent. For
pressurized water reactors (PWRs) significant variations with size and
age were found, as shown in Figure 1.
The standard error is again quite large, 13.9 percent, meaning
that neither model explains a great deal of the data. It follows that
the models are not very useful for predicting performance of new plants.
It is hoped that including annual capital cost and 0 & M cost data, as
well as an indicator variable for geographical region, will improve the
models, but such an effort is reserved for future work.
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To reduce some of the data scatter, especially that due to
periodic refueling, a moving average technique (which averages several
years together) has been applied to data for all plants. The result of
this analysis is a reasonable average value for capacity factor that
grows over plant age for the existing mix of light water reactors (LWRs).
The MIT Regional Electricity Model (REM) mentioned earlier
requires a single input value of capacity factor over all time for LWRs.
Because capacity factor has a direct effect on capital cost, an
economically discounted capacity factor would seem to be the most
appropriate time average to use. A 10 percent discount rate was applied
to the time-dependent LWR capacity factor model developed by the moving
average technique. The resulting 64 percent capacity factor is used in
the reference scenario. (This is higher than the average of about 60
percent mentioned earlier because that average is presently dominated by
very young plants. Capacity factor for a mix of LWRs grows with age.)
By varying the values of capacity factor input to REM, we
determine the effects of this change on the electric generation mix, the
cost of electricity, energy demand, alternative fuel usage, etc. Three
values beyond the base case have been analyzed: 50, 75, and 85 percent.
The 50 and 75 percent values obtain from the moving average analysis;
they are the discounted values of the upper and lower semi-midmeans.
These are useful points since they indicate the potential savings of a
program to bring the poorer performers up to a level proved attainable by
half the existing plants. Likewise they show the cost incurred if the
good performers are permitted to slip into the range of the lower half.
Although the goal of this portion of the study is to examine improvement
programs, the lower figure will provide useful information in case
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unforeseen problems begin to drive performance down. Also it can show
the net cost of reduced performance that could result from efforts to
minimize capital costs. The 85 percent value is the technical, but
economically untenable, upper limit discussed above. These REM runs show
the savings to be expected over the range of interest and feasibility
neglecting the costs of the improvements. Another run includes capital
costs and capacity factor changes for several specific improvement plans
(see Chapter 5).
4.2.4 Strategies for Improving Capacity Factor: Capacity
factor averages near 60 percent. Scheduled outages (mostly refueling
outages) account for about 10 percent of lost production, forced outages
for 10 percent, and power reductions for 20 percent. Attempts to increase
productivity by improving availability (a measure of outage time) ignore
half of the lost energy production. The major cost is lost energy
production, i.e., replacement power cost, not the number of adverse
events. We concern ourselves, therefore, with the product of frequency
of occurrence, fractional power reduction, and duration of reduction.
Certain high frequency events, such as shutdowns due to operator error or
instrument malfunction, were previously assumed to be of major
importance. Detailed analyses have been presented showing that these two
categories dominate total outages. Most of these outages, however, are
of very short duration and their total effect on capacity factor is
almost negligible when compared to other factors. Table 2 lists the
principal contributors to reduced capacity factor. Regulatory problems,
second in magnitude, are not discussed in the technical assessment
segment of this study; they were examined in Chapter 3.
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Significant improvement is offered by a variety of possible
actions: new component designs, standardization, redundancies, improved
plant layout, improved preventive maintenance, addition of advanced
control and monitoring systems, and optimizing planning techniques
applied to spare parts inventories, maintenance scheduling, and
contingency scheduling. Because many of the techniques can be applied to
the same problem, because correction of one problem may affect another,
ana because maintenance on various systems can be accomplished during an
outage caused by some unrelated problem, the benefits from separate
improvements add less than linearly. To analyze this complex problem we
have used decision-risk analysis techniques. Our first step in each case
was to prepare a decision tree detailing options for improvements.
Figure 2 shows a simplified tree for condenser outage problems to
illustrate our approach.
We see economic improvements of over 10 percentage points in
capacity factor worth over $11 million per plant year that could benefit
from DOE support.
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Simplified Tree for Condenser Outage ProblemsFigure 2.
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TABLE 2
Principal Contributors to Reduced Capacity Factor
Projected Savings
Contributor Contribution per Plant per Year
(millions of 1979 $)
Refueling Outagesa
Regulatory Restrictions
Nuclear Fuelb
Turbinesc
PWR Steam Ceneratorsd
Condenserse
13.4 %
4.7 %
4.3 %
2.3 %
$ 4.8
none
$ 0.5
$ 2.1
1.2 %
1.0 %
$ 1.1
$ 0.9
Pumps and Valvesf 4.2 % $ 2.0
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(a) Reduction of average refueling time from 49 to 30 days would
provide annual savings of nearly $4.8 million per plant.
Further efforts to reduce refueling outage duration are not
expected to yield significant savings because other required
maintenance now done in the shadow of refueling would keep the
plant shut down. The 30-day refueling appears to be an
attainable goal and would save 5.2 percentage points in
capacity factor. Computerized outage management could help
optimize scheduling and ensure that delayed jobs do not enter
the critical path. Improved training and refueling tools
promise significant benefits. DOE could disseminate planning
codes and information about successful training and could
support development of improved refueling equipment.
(b) Power reductions due to fuel failures have historically offered
benefits of about $3.9 million per plant year. As discussed in
the nuclear fuel cycle section of this report, corrective
actions may have solved most of the early problems. Lack of
data on the newer fuels makes the magnitude of the remaining
problems uncertain. One area of continuing concern is
power-cycling of Zircaloy-clad fuel. About $500 thousand per
plant year would be saved if nuclear plants could come to full
power more quickly. The same improvements permitting rapid
power ascension would allow load-following operation--a fact of
great importance when installed nuclear capacity exceeds the
base load requirements in a region. Nuclear plants retain
their economic advantage over coal plants whenever they operate
at similar capacity factor and in some parts of the country
even when operating 30 points lower. Thus the ability to
load-follow offers large savings in the future. EPRI, the
utilities, and the fuel manufacturers are following fuel
problems quite closely, so DOE's role is not clear in this area.
(c) Large turbine designs have been relatively stable for many
years and the major problem with one manufacturer's low
pressure blading has apparently been solved by design change.
Two areas of trouble appear often--bearing and control system
failures. New monitoring systems may offer advance warning of
developing problems; the possibility of repair before failure
could save significant outage time. Advanced control systems
should offer higher reliability than the older
electro-mechanical systems. DOE could support R,D&D in turbine
control and monitoring systems, with possible savings of $2.1
million per plant year.
(d) Steam generator problems appear to be unending. The solution
to each existing problem brings new hazards. Denting,
presently the key problem, threatens to require replacement of
several steam generators at costs exceeding $100 million per
steam generator, neglecting replacement power cost. The
catastrophic nature of this problem has already brought the
attention of much of the industry, EPRI, and DOE. It is hard
to judge what the future holds for steam generator problems,
but the support of DOE and the entire industry should not be
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eased until several years of trouble-free operation have been
demonstrated. The potential for disastrous expenses exceeding
all other productivity problems is very real. At historic
levels steam generator problems cost $1.1 million per plant
year.
(e) Condenser failure occurs primarily by tube damage-corrosive
attack on internal surfaces and impingement damage on external
surfaces. Choosing the proper tube material greatly reduces
the first problem (titanium looks particularly promising) while
various mechanical support and protective arrangements can be
used to ease the second. Condenser failure directly costs $900
thousand per plant year. Since many years of design experience
have not solved impingement problems, it might be appropriate
for DOE to suppor R,D&D in this area. Solution of condenser
problems is also a key path to reducing steam generator
failure, which would save another $1.1 million per plant year.
(f) Although pumps and valves contribute significantly to lost
energy production, the problems are distributed over a variety
of components operating in many different environments.
Fortunately a few specific components and generic problems
account for a large fraction of the problems. Seals on PWR
reactor coolant pumps and BWR recirculation pumps average
almost $800 thousand per plant year. Steam leaks and packing
leaks on pumps and valves cost about the same amount. Primary
relief valves contribute nearly as much. An R,D&D program in
these three areas could reduce pump and valve problems by over
50 percent. Although these are old problems that have existed
in conventional power plants for decades, their solutions have
never been worth so much. A dedicated effort would reap
substantial economic benefit.
4.3 The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
As with most aspects of nuclear power, the nuclear fuel cycle
is presently more constrained by executive, legislative, and judicial
action (or the lack of it) at all levels, than by the lack of adequate
technology. This pervasive institutional impasse has had its greatest
immediate effect on factors contributing to plant costs.
While this investigation has focused on these immediate
concerns, some attention is due to the fuel cycle because of its
historical role as contributor to reduced plant capacity factors, its
present role as a major issue in the nuclear debate, and its longer-term
impacts on the nuclear economy, which will be felt through the fuel cycle.
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The commercial nuclear power fuel cycle has provided the low
energy costs needed to justify this capital-intensive form of
electric-power production. Nuclear fuel costs have even declined
slightly as a relative contributor to the overall cost of
nuclear-generated electricity. Nevertheless, a major problem has been
loss of capacity factor due to defective fuel. This loss, amounting to
roughly 4 percent of capacity (as discussed elsewhere in this report),
has contributed an economic penalty equal to the original cost of
fabricating the fuel. The problems are now felt to be under
control--either having been resolved or approaching resolution.
Accumulating experience and developing incentives to avoid restrictions
on load following should lead to continuing improvements in this area.
There are obvious institutional deadlocks over fuel
reprocessing/recyling and waste disposal. The former is due in part to
concerns over weapons proliferation, and both involve long-term
radiological safety. There is a panoply of subsidiary and peripheral
issues, but these two generic concerns threaten to have the greatest
long-term impact. If a satisfactory accomodation were generally
perceived to be possible in these areas, then several decades of
operation with the current once-through LWR fuel cycle could be
contemplated with equanimity. In fact, core design and fuel management
strategy changes (primarily increasing burnup and the number of staggered
core batches) could probably improve the once-through ore utilization in
a LWR to the point that it equals ore utilization in the fuel-recycle
mode (in current LWR designs). Failure to reach consensus robs the
nuclear option of its role as an energy strategy for non-transitory
scenarios: only fuel recycle into breeder reactors elevates nuclear
power to the status of an enduring solution to future energy needs.
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The future role of the stand-alone LWR, even apart from the
resolution of institutional impediments, is closely linked to the
widely-debated issue of the uranium cost/supply relationship, an issue of
inherent and perhaps irreconcilable uncertainty. Since ore costs amount
to 50 percent or more of projected lifetime fuel-cycle costs for LWRs now
coming on-line, this component is the primary determinant of the future
economic prospects for the LWR. Our analysis shows that the
scarcity-related rate of increase in the (constant dollar) price of
yellowcake should be roughly two-thirds the rate of increase in uranium
consumption. Ore costs will become increasingly onerous until at some
point, estimated to be $150/lb U308 in 1978 dollars, the unmodified LWR
will no longer be competitive with either coal-fired units or breeder
reactors. One cannot predict with certainty when this will occur, nor
even when a believable prediction can be made. For present purposes,
however, it is important to recognize that increasing the plant capacity
factor and reducing as-built costs will provide an important margin
against the long-term impact of rising fuel cycle costs. Core design,
fuel management practices, and separative work consumption (hopefully
using new and cheaper technology) can also be traded off to reduce the
use of increasingly expensive U308. Advanced LWR designs can be
anticipated in response to a convincing threat of technological
obsolescence, whether in the form of resource depletion or immutable
policy.
The application of available technology and the development and
deployment of technological innovations in the nuclear fuel cycle are
considerably blocked by governmental pre-emption and policy, and the lack
of timely, enduring regulatory action. Indeed, private-sector technology
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in the back end of the cycle is unlikely to survive. Even apart from
regulatory uncertainty, policy uncertainty underlying the need for intact
fuel assembly disposal, for example, is sure to deter unsubsidized
entrepreneurship. Paradoxically, however, there are prospects of
Federally-originated requirements for the creation of substantial new
technology, outside of that generated by normal market incentives. The
development of ultra-high burnup fuel for use in the once-through fuel
cycle is one likely example. Long burnup is considerably less attractive
in the recycle mode from a fuel cycle standpoint, and might therefore not
be anticipated as a vendor- or utility-originated R&D objective. Even
here, however, the situation is not simple since one can presume such
fuel would have enhanced reliability in applications demanding lower
burnups. Such considerations can form the basis for near-term technical
collaboration despite the lack of parallel policy objectives.
In summary, we have severely circumscribed in-depth analyses of
the fuel cycle in our detailed technical investigations. Reducing plant
costs and outages pose more immediate problems, with larger and faster
payoffs, and, perhaps more importantly, there is a consensus among all
interested parties that these goals are desirable. To be sure, there is
need for parallel action on the fuel cycle; but the nature of the
problems faced do not appear to mesh very well with the problems examined
here.
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5. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LIGHT WATER REACTOR DEVELOPMENT
5.1 Introduction
Improvements in LWR technology, such as lower capital costs and
increased plant availability, decrease the costs of delivering
electricity. Lower costs will result in increased investment in LWR
technology relative to competing technologies by decreasing the price of
electricity in proportion to the increased share of nuclear in meeting
electricity demand, thereby increasing electricity demand due to
substitution of electricity for competing direct fuel uses. Thus LWR
technology improvements increase the use of LWR both through increasing
the share of LWR in total generation and increasing aggregate generation
through fuel substitution. Evaluating the benefits to consumers of
improvements in LWR technology therefore requires a framework that
accounts separately for these different effects.
Our approach to estimating the direct and indirect consequences to
consumers and the utility industry of changes in factors influencing LWR
technology costs and availability has been to employ the M.I.T. Regional
Electricity Model (REM). This model provides a framework in which to
analyze and account for the interactions between capacity expansion and
generation mix decisions, the demand for electricity and competing fuels
and the regulatory process, which sets the price of electricity. The
important independent variables to be specified in using the model
include:
o gross national product (GNP), personal income, manufacturing
value added, population, and inflation;
o national average fuel prices for oil, gas, and coal, and either
the price of uranium or a cumulative uranium cost/production
schedule; and
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o capital, fuel cycle, and operation and maintenance costs for
each of nine plant types, including uranium- and
plutonium-fueled LWRs, HTGR, LMFBR, coal, oil, gas hydro, and
turbines; maximum plant availability factor by plant type.
Model outputs include: (i) the demand for electricity and competing
fuels (oil, gas, coal) by state for residential, commercial, industrial,
and electric utilities; (ii) the capacity expansion plans by plant type
for 10 utility regions, and together with the generation mix schedule
necessary to satisfy demand, the financial flows to support expansion;
and (iii) regulated electricity price determined by Public Utility
Commissions. Thus REM provides a framework within which the direct and
indirect effects of improvements in LWR technology or in institutional
and regulatory factors influencing LWR cost and efficiency factors may be
evaluated.
Our approach employing REM has been to develop and analyze a
reference scenario using values for independent variables consistent with
no major policy or technology initiatives. The reference scenario is
then adjusted to reflect the effects of some particular initiative--say,
the effects of plant standardization upon capital cost. Results are then
compared with the reference case and summary measures--such as changes in
discounted delivered energy costs or in use of petroleum--are calculated.
A note of caution is in order when interpreting the results of our
analysis. The results of the reference case should not be construed as a
"most likely" forecast. While the reference case does reflect current
expected costs, prices, and efficiencies, as well as the realization of
current expansion plans, we do not offer it as a forecast. Rather it
should be construed as a benchmark from which differential effects may be
calculated. We are much more confident in the ability of REM to project
the differential effects of cost and efficiency changes than we are of
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TABLE 3
Key Parameter Values for Reference Scenario
FUEL PRICE (CURRENT DOLLARS)a
Coal
(s/ton)
24.82
33.31
48.30
64.54
90.52
Nat. Gasb
(¢ MCF)
155
201
395
713
1085
Oil
(S Bbt)
8.18
15.47
22.97
33.97
50.48
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Real GNP Growth---2.1% 1974
Real Value Added
In Manufacturing: 0.0% 1976
Real Personal
Income: 3.r
INFLATION RATE
Nonf arm WholesaT Price
12.5% 1974
8.5% 1975
5.5% 1976 -
POPULATION GROWTH
1.2% Per Year 197-4 -
8% 1976
-1997
Index
1997
1997
UNIT CAPITAL COSTS (KILOWATT) (For New England in Current Dollars):c
COAL OIL NATURAL GAS NUCLEAR GAS TURBINES
1975 407.0 280.2 248.0 455.2 134.0
1980 629.6 486.8 442.0 723.4 178.8
1985 862.6 780.0 672.4 991.0 228.6
1990 1181.8 1110.0 920.8 1358.2 288.0
1995 1619.0 1520.0 1261.8 1860.8 362.6
COST OF U308 ($ POUND) COSTS OF SEPARATIVE WORK INFLATOR
(CURRENT DOLLARS) ($ SWU CURRENT DOLLARS)
1975 12.51 75.70 1.000
1980 27.17 111.09 1.307
1985 55.29 145.19 1.708
1990 93.88 189.76 2.232
1995 141.13 248.01 2.918
NOTE: Data are in 5-year intervals; however, they are available on an annual
basis.
aValues in Table 3 are average national prices, natural gas and oil at the
welihead, and coal at the minemouth. Transportation markups are added on for
each region in the model. It is assumed that the average wellhead price for
natural gas is 40 MCF less than new contract prices shown in Table 3.
bThe natural gas price shown corresponds to the average contract price for
new intrastate sales. This price is used in the model to determine the merit
order of existing natural gas plants for generation purposes. The model is
constrained to build no new natural gas plants in the simulation.
CIn the model regional variations in plant capital costs are given relative
to New England.
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
___I -L-a __y _ -- ·- ·--1_- .-_11-1 ------- ^--- ----------- _-_- - -
---- I-----I--·
- __----I-- _ =- -- ------·--_ - --l---rY·---------
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our own ability to use the model to forecast future levels of electricity
demand and electric power sector investment patterns and production
behavior.
5.2 Reference Scenario
Table 3 presents reference scenario values for key input variables
to the model. Additional assumptions of the reference scenario include
no domestic fuel reprocessing (stow-away fuel cycle), a ten-year planning
and construction period for LWR plants, and a restriction that no natural
gas-fired plants may be constructed. Given these assumptions and the
input data of Table 3, the major results of the reference scenario are:
(1) Table 4 summarizes national electricity demand for the period
1975-1995. National electricity demand is projected to grow at 4.7
percent per year. The growth rate is higher in the earlier years (4.9
percent per year 1975-1985) than in later years (4.6 percent per year
1985 - 1995). The assumption about the GNP growth rate has an important
influence upon our results. For example, decreasing or increasing the
GNP growth rate by 10 percent (from 3.8 percent to 3.3 percent and 4.3
percent respectively) changed national electricity demand from 4 8
percent to 4.5 percent and 5.2 percent, respectively. Regional variation
in electricity demand growth is substantial, ranging from 2.6 percent per
vear in the Middle Atlantic region to 7.9 percent per year in the
Mountain region.
(2) Table 5 summarizes the national shares in generation for
nuclear, coal, oil and gas, hydro, and IC in 1975-1997. Nuclear power
increases its share in generation from 10 percent in 1975 to 46 percent
in 1995. Nuclear capacity in 1995 is projected to be 399 GWe operating
at a national average capacity factor of .64. The share of coal based
generation is projected to be 38 percent by 1995. The regional variation
of generation shares is significant. For example, in 1995 nuclear
accounts for a high of 74 percent of generation in the East-South Central
region and a low of 4 percent of generation in the Mountain region.
(3) Fuel consumption patterns change signficantly over the period.
Electric generation consumption of oil and gas decreased from 760 million
barrels equivalent (MBE) in 1975 to 492 MBE in 1997. Coal consumption
for generation increases from 346 to 670 million tons over the period,
and consumption of uranium increases from 13.7 to 92.3 thousand tons.
Cumulative uranium consumption by 1997 is projected to be 1,045 thousand
tons.
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TABLE 4
Electricity Demand, National and for
Selected Regions for Selected Years
Reference Case (MMWe)
National Mid-Atlantic Mountain
Region Region
1975 1878 233 102
1980 2329 259 178
1985 3043 303 330
1990 3914 352 467
1995 4827 414 540
LWR
193.7
419.9
899.5
1266.0
2224.0
TABLE 5
Generation by Plant Type
Reference Case (MMWe)
Coal Oil & Gas
900.0 464.8
1031.6 506.4
1291.1 434.5
1753.6 431.8
1835.9 260.3
IC
5.6
7.0
9.2
11.7
14.5
Hydro
314.3
364.2
408.5
451.1
492.4
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
-----------
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(4) The discounted cost of total electricity and directly competing
fuels used in the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors over
the period 1977-1997 is $1,838 billion (5 percent discount rate).
5.3 Analysis of Initiatives
The objective of developing and analyzing the reference scenario is
to provide a benchmark from which the impact of changes in LWR costs,
efficiencies, and availability can be measured, due either to technical
or policy initiatives. The particular initiatives under consideration
are developed in detail elsewhere in this Final Report and may be
summarized as follows:
a. Reductions in capital cost of LWRs due to a variety of
technical initiatives including, most significantly, plant
standarization,
b. Changes in maximum capacity factor for LWRs,
c. Continuation of the present "de facto" moratorium on investment
in nuclear capacity, and
d. Change in the definition of the rate base to include
construction work-in-progress.
5.3.1 Capital Cost Reductions: Several scenarios involving
changes in the capital costs of LWRs have been analyzed.* Of greatest
interest is the summary scenario in which the combined initiatives of
Section 4.1 are analyzed. The net effect of these combined scenarios is
estimated to be a reduction in LWR capital costs of approximately 10
percent from the reference scenario ($592 to $532/KW, in 1977 $).
The net effect of a decrease in LWR capital cost is to reduce
the busbar cost of electricity from nuclear, thereby decreasing the
regulated price of electricity, increasing the demand for electricity,
*Capital costs are here defined as net of financial charges during
construction, the measure most appropriate when evaluating R,D&D
initiatives.
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increasing investment in nuclear as well as nuclear's share in the
generation mix, and decreasing generation from other sources relative to
nuclear. This is precisely what happens when R,D&D initiatives are
pursued leading to a 10 percent reduction in nuclear capital costs for
plants initiatied in 1980. Thus by 1997, and measuring relative to the
reference scenario:
- The price of electricity has decreased to 81.7 mills/kWh (down
6.3 percent).
- Electricity demand has increased to 5325 MMWH (up 5.9 percent),
- Nuclear capacity is 495 GWe, up 7.1 percent, and nuclear's share
in total generation is 51.8 percent (up slightly from 51.3
percent).
- Cumulative consumption of scarce oil and gas over the period has
decreased 390 MBE from 14,770 for electricity generation. Total
discounted economic costs of electricity and directly competing
fuels are reduced about 0.2 percent from $1.838 * 1012.
5.3.2 Changes in LWR Capacity Factors: Next we consider the
effect of changes in LWR capacity factor upon demand, capacity expansion,
generation, and fuel use. Again a variety of scenarios have been
analyzed, but the most interesting involves the implementation of
improvements leading to an increase of 10 percentage points (from .64 in
the reference scenario) in the maximum available LWR capacity. As with
the decrease in capital costs, such capacity factor improvements are of
considerable economic importance to society. Thus:
- Electricity prices decrease to 81.7 mills/kWh, down 6.2
percent. Demand increases to 5536 MMWH, up 5.3 percent.
- Nuclear capacity is 551 GWe, up 19.3 percent, and nuclear's
share in total generation is 61.9, up significantly from 51.3
percent in the reference scenario.
- Cumulative consumption of oil and gas over the period 1977-97 is
down 17.7 percent from 14,770 MBE. Total discounted energy
costs are down 0.8 percent from $11,838 * 1012.
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Hence, the economic gains from initiatives to improve nuclear capacity
factor are substantial.
These economic benefits are calculated under the assumption that
improvements in capacity factor are obtained through improved scheduling
and management of maintenance and refueling, and have no measurable
costs. An alternative scenario is that improvements in LWR capacity
factors can result from increases in capital expenditures. Such an
analysis is provided in Section 4.2, where it is shown that around the
present capital cost and capacity factor, a 1 percent improvement in
capacity factor may be obtained with a 0.4 percent increase in capital
costs. Using this relationship we analyze the effect of an investment of
4 percent increase in capital costs to obtain a 10 percent increase in
capacity factor, investments beginning for plants initiated in 1980. The
economic benefits are still substantial. Thus, by 1997:
- Total electricity demand is up 2.9 percent from 5257 MMWh.
- Nuclear capacity is 520 GWe, up 12.8 percent from the reference
case, providing 59.3 percent of generation.
- Cumulative consumption of oil and gas are down 2.2 * 109
barrels equivalent, and discounted total energy costs over the
period are down $9.0 * 109.
5.3.3 Continuing the De Facto Moratorium: Sections 2 and 3
discussed the institutional and regulatory issues influencing development
and use of LWRs. We concluded that one product of these issues is vendor
and utility uncertainty, which is reflected in risk-averse investment
behavior. In large part the investment behavior of the past 4-6 years
reflects this uncertainty. While our analytical capability does not yet
include an explicit representation of the response of investment behavior
to this type of uncertainty, we can analyze the consequences of a
continuing moratorium on nuclear construction for whatever reasons. Such
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a scenario will involve two elements: a constraint on nuclear capacity
construction of a specified time, and an explicit characterization of the
rate of recovery for vendors at the end of the moratorium. For our
present purposes we assume a five-year absolute construction moratorium
beginning in 1978, followed by a five-year vendor capacity recovery
period. Under these assumptions we can expect:
- An increase of electricity prices from 87.2 in the reference case
to 94.0 mills/kWh, with a corresponding 4 percent decrease in
electricity demand.
- Nuclear capacity is reduced to 218 GWe, down 48.7 percent from
the reference case. On the other hand, coal capacity is 557 GWe,
up 32.3 percent from the reference case.
- Cumulative consumption of oil and gas is increased over the
period 1977-97 by .81 * 109 barrels, and total discounted
energy costs are increased by $13.0 * 109.
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